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Abstract:  We  examine,  experimentally  and  theoretically,  how  communication  within  a 
partnership may mitigate the problem (highlighted in contract theory) of hidden action. What 
is the form and content of the communication?  Which model of decision-making can capture 
the impact of communication? We consider free-form communication, measure beliefs (about 
actions and beliefs), and examine which motivational forces influence subjects. We find they 
harbor belief-dependent preferences that can be captured using psychological game theory.  
In particular, agents are influenced by guilt aversion, which suggests a theory of why and 
how  communication  influences  behavior  in  which  statements  of  intent  and  resulting 
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Much  of  human  achievement  is  produced  in  partnerships.    An  extensive  body  of 
theoretical research¾contract theory¾is devoted to understanding which partnerships form, 
what contracts are signed, what the economic consequences will be.  The insights offered 
represent  major  intellectual  discoveries,  pinpointing  subtle  ways  that  informational 
asymmetries, legal issues, and other considerations may matter. Much  attention has been 
devoted to environments with hidden action, in which some future choice by a contracting 
party cannot be regulated by a contract.1  Contract theorists have shown that if people are 
rational  and  selfish  (caring  only  about  own  income),  hidden  action  is  a  shoal  on  which 
efficient contracting may founder. 
Most of contract theory makes scant reference to empirical observation. Perhaps one 
should not simply accept its logic without questioning its empirical relevance. We focus on 
one particular aspect where the traditional contract theoretic perspective may be too barren: 
communication.    The  conventional  approach  implicitly  assumes  that  non-binding 
communication is ineffective in promoting partnership formation and cooperation; written 
contracts  bind  if  supported  by  the  law,  but  oral  agreements  (to  quote  Samuel  Goldwyn) 
”aren't worth the paper they're written on”. We feel that this view is at odds with reality, 
where  promises,  discussions,  handshakes,  threats,  and  other  forms  of  communication  are 
often used when agreements are made. These casual observations justify a suspicion that 
communication can foster trust and cooperation in settings with hidden action, in contrast to 
the prediction of conventional contract theory. 
This paper contains an experimental and theoretical examination of this idea. We are 
interested in four basic questions: 
 
                                                 
1 This condition is often referred to as moral hazard.  For entries to the literature, see e.g. Hart & Holmström 
(1986), Dutta & Radner (1993), and Salanié (1998, chapter 5). 2
Q1. Are the predictions of classical contract theory borne out in the lab?  
Q2. Does communication foster cooperation?  
Q3. What is the form and content of the communication?  
Q4. Which theories of decision-making and communication can explain the data?  
 
We find that the answer to Q1 is (a qualified) No, which justifies our interest in the 
other questions. Q2 concerns whether or not communication influences behavior, regardless 
of why this might be the case. Q3 sheds light on how people use communication strategically, 
to  convey  information  that  might  foster  trust  and  cooperation.  Q4  is  essential  for 
understanding  the  motivational  forces  that  drive  behavior,  and  why  communication  may 
matter in this connection.   If contract theory turns out to need revision, such insight is crucial 
for  understanding  what  contracts  are  ‘behaviorally  optimal’,  and  for  deriving  testable 
predictions that allow exploration of how far the results extend to other economic settings. 
We  approach  Q4  by  testing  how  well  some  recently  proposed  models  of  social 
preferences explain our data.  Experimentalists have accumulated a wealth of evidence that 
decision-makers are not completely selfish.  In response researchers have recently proposed 
several explanatory models, which make reference to various notions of fairness, reciprocity, 
etc.2  To a person familiar with this literature, it will come as no surprise that these models 
can explain why problems of hidden action may be overcome.  However, previous work has 
not focused on what these models imply regarding the impact of communication.  This is a 
key feature of our analysis. 
The  mathematical  structure  of  the  social-preference  models  has  important  bearing 
both  on  how  to  set  up  experimental  tests  and  on  how  to  understand  the  role  of 
communication.    In  some  models  decision-makers’  preferences  depend  only  the  overall 
distribution of monetary earnings among the reference group. These distributional models do 
not represent a radical breach with conventional economic theory; they can be represented as 
conventional  games,  in  which  preferences  are  defined  on  strategy  profiles  only  (because 
                                                 
2 For descriptions of the experimental evidence and the social-preferences literature, see Fehr & Gächter (2000), 
Fehr & Schmidt (2001), and Sobel (2001). 3
strategic  choices  imply  final  distributions,  which  is  a  decision-maker’s  only  concern).  
Another class of models, which may be labeled belief-dependent, is far more complicated as 
decision-makers’ motivation depends directly on their perceptions of intentions or beliefs. 
Preferences must be defined on non-standard domains, as decision-makers care for more than 
strategy  profiles.    One  is  led  outside  the  realm  of  standard  game  theory  and  into  the 
framework, proposed by Geanakoplos, Pearce & Stacchetti (1989), of psychological game 
theory.    To  experimentally  test  psychological  games  based  models  with belief-dependent 
utility it is not sufficient to merely record strategic choices; one must also elicit certain beliefs 
(about actions and about beliefs).  We develop a design that allows us to do so.3 
The scope for communication to matter in distributional models is rather limited, and 
essentially concerns only  equilibrium selection  in games with multiple equilibria.   In the 
games we consider, distributional models yield unique predictions (even without assuming 
equilibrium play) and therefore imply that communication should not matter.  By contrast, 
subtle  links  surface  in  models  with  belief-dependent  utilities,  leading  to  communication 
affecting behavior. Messages influence beliefs, beliefs influence motivation, and motivation 
affects behavior.  Since our experimental design involves belief elicitation, we can examine if 
and how such links matter, and thereby learn about the impact of communication. 
The idea that communication can affect strategic interaction, and experiments related 
to the topic, are of course not new.4  However, we propose that our tack is novel in many 
ways.  First,  the  strategic  setting  we  consider  is  motivated  from  a  contract-theoretic 
perspective.  The game we derive has a ‘trust’ structure, and is different from the games 
considered  in  other  studies  (which  typically  concern  prisoner’s  dilemmas,  coordination 
                                                 
3 Measuring beliefs is a recent innovation in experimental work; Dufwenberg & Gneezy (2000) and Nyarko & 
Schotter (2002) have developed relevant methods. 
4 Some work is found in psychology. Dawes, McTavish & Shaklee (1977) find that ‘relevant' face-to-face 
communication (about the situation at hand) leads to a substantially higher rate of cooperation in a commons 
dilemma.  Orbell, Dawes & van de Kragt (1990) study multilateral communication, and find that promises 
enhance cooperation if everyone in a game makes them.  Communication may also be relevant to the extent that 
contracts are social contracts (Blau, 1964), psychological contracts (Rousseau, 1995), or reflect social norms 
(Bicchieri,  2002).    In  experimental  economics,  communication  has  been  found  to  improve  outcomes  in 
coordination games (e.g., Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe & Ross, 1990, 1992; Charness, 2000) and has been studied 
in bargaining environments (Valley, Moag & Bazerman, 1998; Bohnet & Frey, 1999; Ellingsen & Johannesson, 
2002; Brandts & Charness, forthcoming; Brosig, Ockenfels & Weimann, forthcoming.  A related strand of 
literature focuses on deception in games; we connect to this work in section 3.3 below. 4
games, or bargaining games). Second, and perhaps most importantly, by linking our work to 
psychological games we incorporate a new theoretical perspective.  We measure beliefs and 
test models with belief-dependent utility; and eventually  provide the  rudiments of a new 
theory of why communication matters. 
Our paper may be seen as a contribution to a field that may be labeled ‘behavioral 
contract  theory’.    Loewenstein  (1999)  defines  behavioral  economics  as  bringing 
"psychological insights to bear on economic phenomena".  The field of behavioral contract 
theory should be seen as a sub-field of behavioral economics, and would thus be sister to 
fields like behavioral finance and behavioral game theory.  Behavioral contract theory takes 
into account social and psychological considerations in an attempt to understand partnerships 
and contracts. 
Two approaches to behavioral contract theory may be distinguished.  First, one may 
explore (experimentally or theoretically) which contract people choose when there are many 
feasible ones.5  Second, one may consider one specific contractual arrangement, and attempt 
to understand that environment in some depth.  The current paper belongs here, and the in-
depth  issues  we  explore  are  Q1-Q4.    We  explore  whether  and  why  a  given  contract  is 
acceptable to two parties, with and without communication.  We make no presumption that 
the contract we look at is ‘optimal’ - that would be impossible since we enter the analysis 
being open-minded with respect to what motivational forces are at work. The objective is to 
reveal  insights  about  decision-making  and  motivation  that  are  useful  for  developing 
behavioral contract theory further. 
Theory, experiment, and conclusions appear in Sections 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 
 
2. THEORY 
In this section we develop a simple model of a partnership (2.1), from which we 
derive our experimental games (2.2).  This exercise highlights the contract-theoretic backdrop 
to our design, and we argue that it also has some independent value.  The model may provide 
                                                 
5 Examples of this approach include Anderhub, Gächter & Königstein (2002), Cabrales & Charness (2000), 
Fehr, Klein & Schmidt (2001), Güth, Klose, Königstein & Schwalbach (1998). 5
a useful framework for other experimental studies, since it is simple and yet flexible enough 
to admit examination of a variety of contract-theoretic issues.  In this paper we elicit a simple 
mono-contractual setting incorporating hidden action, but other versions could be used for 
considering  hidden  information  (adverse  selection),  multiple  contracts,  or  richer  strategic 
settings. 
We  also  introduce  several  theories  of  social  preferences  (2.3),  and  derive  testable 
predictions for the experimental analysis. 
  
2.1 A benchmark model 
A principal and an agent consider forming a partnership in which a project is carried 
out.  If no partnership is formed, then no contract is signed, no project is carried out, and the 
parties get their outside-option payoffs x for the principal and y for the agent (measured in 
dollars). If the project is carried out, then the contract specifies a ‘wage’ w that the principal 
must pay to the agent.  The project generates revenue for the principal.  There can be two 
outcomes: failure or success.  A failure generates revenue r > 0, while a success involves an 
additional bonus of b > 0, so that total revenue is r+b.  The probability of these outcomes 
depends on the choice and characteristic of the agent; we assume the agent chooses ‘effort’, 
eÎ[0,1], and has a given ‘talent’, tÎ[0,1], and that the probability of success is et.6  The agent 
experiences increasing ‘effort cost’, measured in dollars and equal to ce, where c > 0.   
In order to derive a benchmark, consider the Nash bargaining solution for risk-neutral 
and  selfish  players,  assuming  that  effort  and  wage  is  contractible  and  that  all  the  other 
parameters are commonly known to the two parties. Suppose the project is carried out, the 
agent's talent is t, the principal pays the wage w to the agent, and the agent chooses effort e. 
Following Nash (1950), one sees that the solution will be the wage-effort combination (w,e) 
that maximizes  
 
[(r-w+etb)-x]·[(w-ce)-y]       (1) 
                                                 
6 This specification is inspired by Dufwenberg & Lundholm's (2000) model; see their Sect. 1.1 and Figure 1.   6
 
whenever  it  is  possible  to  choose  (w,e)  so  that  each  factor  of  this  product  is  positive 
(otherwise, no partnership would form).  In this paper, we assume that the agent's talent is 
high enough and the cost of effort is low enough that the expected return from exerting effort 
exceeds the cost of the effort.  This requires that etb > ce if e > 0, or equivalently t > c/b.  We 
also assume that it is indeed possible to choose (w,e) so that each factor of (1) is positive.  A 
sufficient condition is that r+tb-c>x+y.  The Nash bargaining solution is then given by (2) & 
(3): 
 
w* = (r + tb - x + y + c)/2      (2) 
e* = 1            (3) 
 
The reader may wonder why we have bothered to include in this (otherwise rather 
spare) model a move by nature that determines the success of the project, rather than just 
replace that move with its expected outcome.  We have done so to reflect circumstances 
where  the  contract  cannot  be  conditioned  on  the  agent's  choice  of  effort  (which  will  be 
relevant in what follows) or the agent's talent (which would be relevant in a context of hidden 
information).  A typical justification for such contractual limits, often stressed by contract 
theorists, is that the agent's effort, or talent, is not observable to the principal, or at least to 
third  parties.    Thus  contractual  clauses  about  effort  choices  or  talent  levels  are  not 
enforceable in court (see Holmström, 1979). 
If,  however,  outcomes  were  perfectly  correlated  with  the  value  of  such  an 
unobservable,  then  the  agent's  choice  of  effort,  or  level  of  talent,  could  nevertheless  be 
inferred with certainty, and thus (arguably) be enforceable in court.  The move by nature is 
essential for making conceptual sense of our exercise. With this move, if a project fails due to 
low effort, or talent, the agent can claim that he exerted high effort, or that he had a high 
talent, but that he had bad luck.  The chance move ensures that it cannot be proven in court 
that he lied, once effort or talent is not directly observable by third parties.  
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2.2 The experimental games 
The  gist  of  modern  contract  theory  derives  from  assumptions  about  asymmetric 
information between the principal and the agent.  A major issue is the choice of contract 
when the agent's effort is not contractible (hidden action) or when the principal does not 
know the agent’s talent (hidden information).  The assumption is typically maintained that the 
principal and the agent are perfectly selfish.   
  We shall consider circumstances characterized by hidden action.  However, we will 
not examine which contract out of many feasible ones will be agreed upon, given a particular 
motivation.  Rather we stay open-minded with respect to the nature of the motivation and 
examine, for a given contract, how serious the problems caused by hidden action are in the 
first place.  That contract corresponds to the benchmark solution of the previous section, for 
the following specific set of parameters: 
 
r = 14    c = 4    x = 5 
b = 12   t = 5/6   y = 5      (4) 
 
If both wage and effort were contractible, using (2) and (3), we would get (w*,e*) = 
(14,1).  However, we will now remove the assumption that the effort can be regulated in the 
contract  and  instead  assume  that  it  remains  for  the  agent  to  choose  his  effort  level;  this 
incorporates hidden action.  We restrict the agent to two possibilities: eÎ{0,1}.  Will the 
outcome corresponding to the Nash bargaining solution still obtain? 
There are two basic reasons why it may not.  First, the agent may choose e = 0 instead 
of e = 1, keeping the contractual wage w* = 14 while opportunistically saving himself the 
effort cost. Second, the principal may foresee such a turn of events, dislike it, and not agree to 




First, the principal decides whether to say Yes or No to the contract according which 
he must pay w* = 14 to the agent.  If he says Yes, then a partnership is formed and the project 
is carried out, but it remains for the agent to choose his effort level e = 0 or e = 1.  The 
payoffs are derived using (4) and the assumptions spelt out in section 2.1.7 
If the players are selfish the game has an obvious (backward induction) solution.  If 
called upon to play, the agent would exert low effort.  The principal's best response is to 
choose No, not agreeing to form a partnership.  This outcome is inefficient, since both parties 
receive a higher expected payoff with the (Yes, e = 1) outcome then when no partnership is 
formed;  this  is  a  simple  illustration  of  how  conditions  of  hidden  action  may  undermine 
efficient contracting. 
Our experiment is built around the game in Figure 1, but we consider two treatments 
that differ according to whether or not a communication opportunity is present.  In the no-
communication treatment the experimental design corresponds directly to the game in Figure 
1.    In  the  communication  treatment  we  consider  an  augmented  version,  with  an  added 
preceding communication stage where the agent may transmit a message to the principal.  





If the players are selfish and risk-neutral, the presence of the communication stage has 
no impact on the analysis.  The above argument, leading to the (Yes, e = 1) outcome in the 
game of Figure 1, goes through unchanged for the post-communication subgame in Figure 2.  
Hence, with selfish players, again the theoretical prediction is that no partnerships are formed 
and that the outcomes will be inefficient.  
                                                 
7 In case the principal chooses No, no partnership is formed and each of the prospective partners earns her or his 
outside option of 5 (= x = y).  In case the principal chooses Yes and the agent chooses e = 0 the project will fail 
(et = 0×5/6 = 0), so the principal gets r-w* = 14-14 = 0 and the agent gets w*-ce = 14-4×0 = 14. In case the 
principal chooses Yes and the agent chooses e = 1 the outcome corresponds exactly to the Nash bargaining 
solution given (4). 
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2.3 Social preferences and the impact of communication 
In  order  to  apply  the  non-self-interested  behavior  observed  in  experiments  to 
economic  settings  such  as  consumer  response  to  price  changes  or  employee  response  to 
changes  in  wages  and  employment  practices,  researchers  have  begun  to  develop  formal 
models of social preferences that assume people are not solely selfish, but also care in some 
way about others.  In this section, we examine how such ideas bear on our setting.   
The development of the social-preference literature has to a large extent been inspired 
by experimental results. Fehr & Gächter (2002) summarize the development.  They suggest 
that a diverse set of economic phenomena can be understood as involving some form of 
‘reciprocal behavior’, but note that there are several (competing or complementary) models 
that can explain various facets of such behavior, and that more work is needed to understand 
the  motivational  forces  at  work.    Here  we  consider  how  three  approaches  might  explain 
cooperation and the impact of communication in our context.   
First we have the purely distributional approach, in which only the final monetary 
distribution is seen as relevant to the decision. The process leading to this distribution is 
either seen as irrelevant or as captured implicitly by distributional proxies.  We focus on 
inequity aversion, as presented in Fehr & Schmidt (1999) and Bolton & Ockenfels (2000).8  
Second,  we  consider  kindness-based  reciprocity,  as  described  in  Rabin  (1993)  and 
Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (1998).  Under this motivation, people consider the degree of 
kindness  embodied  in  choices  made  by  other  people.    Third,  we  discuss  a  form  of 
expectations-based motivation that we call guilt aversion.  People prefer to avoid the guilt 
that results from disappointing the expectations of a person who has acted decently.  These 
three  approaches differ  in terms of how communication may influence behavior, and we 
derive testable predictions that are subsequently addressed in the experiment.  
We shall test these theories in a very basic form, referring only to properties of the 
utility functions of individual decision-makers.  We shall not derive and test elaborate notions 
                                                 
8 Nevertheless, our conclusions here stand for any model with purely distributional preferences (e.g., the social-
welfare preferences in the basic (non-reciprocity) form of the Charness & Rabin, 2002 model).  
of ‘equilibrium’.  Most of economic theory assumes that subjects coordinate on some kind of 
equilibrium, and the entailed predictions may fail either because the underlying utilities are 
erroneously  specified  or  because  the  equilibrium  coordination  is  not  present.    We  shall 
concentrate solely on the accuracy of the preference description, without worrying also about 




In models of inequity aversion, people are presumed to like money but also (possibly 
with  heterogeneity)  dislike  disparities  in  payoffs.    Such  models  are  quite  successful  in 
explaining a variety of experimental data; applied to our games, they allow the agent to prefer 
e = 1 to e = 0, if he is sufficiently averse to getting a higher payoff than the principal.  Thus, 
inequity-aversion  models  are  capable  of  explaining  why  problems  of  hidden  action  are 
overcome. 
These models refer only to the monetary payoffs that result from the agent's choices.  
Such distributional models have the great virtue of being simple to apply and to test.  It is 
therefore important to assess their range of applicability.  We check one particular dimension 
of  this  issue:  Can  purely  distributional  models  capture  how  communication  influences 
strategic interaction in a setting with hidden action? 
In games where distributional models admit multiple equilibria, communication may 
play a role by facilitating coordination on some particular equilibrium.  However, in our 
game distributional models generate unique predictions concerning the behavior of agents 
(barring unlikely cases of indifference).  Therefore, a stark prediction emerges concerning the 
impact of communication.  Note that the e = 1 prediction for an inequity-averse agent was 
made  without  reference  to  whether  or  not  the  player's  choices  were  preceded  by  a 
communication  stage.    The  upshot  is  that  the  inequity-aversion  models  predict  that 
communication does not matter.9 
                                                 
9 Two comments are in order: (i) Communication may matter if the degree of inequity aversion is made a 




The classic reference for a model of kindness-based reciprocity is Rabin (1993). In his 
model, decision-makers wish to be kind to those they believe to be kind, and to be unkind to 
those they believe to be unkind.  The notion of kindness in his theory is rather complex, 
taking into account what a person believes he accomplishes with his behavior.  Intentions 
matter.    Similarly,  the  definition  of  believed  kindness  takes  into  account  what  a  person 
believes about the kindness of others.  Since kindness is belief-dependent, believed kindness 
depends on what the person believes others believe they accomplish with their behavior.  To 
exemplify all of this, if someone flies into a building he is not unkind unless he did it on 
purpose, and if others believe this was non-purposeful behavior, the event would be no cause 
for  engaging  in  war.    Rabin's  theory  captures  such  ideas,  and  requires  the  toolbox  of 
psychological  game  theory  because  of  the  belief-dependency  of  kindness,  and  believed 
kindness. 
Rabin's model is developed for games represented in normal form, and is only meant 
to highlight the key qualitative features of reciprocity.  As Rabin notes (p. 1296), it is not 
well-suited  for  applied  work  involving  games  that  have  (as  here)  a  non-trivial  dynamic 
structure.  Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (1998) develop a model of reciprocity for extensive-
form games, which is more amenable to applied work.10 We shall rely on that model to derive 
a prediction concerning the agent in our game.  We refer to the original paper for a full 
presentation of the theory, and here just introduce enough notation to handle our specific 
example: Let t denote the probability with which the agent chooses e = 1; let t' denote the 
principal’s expectation of t; let t'' denote the agent’s expectation of t' (everything measured 
at the agent's decision node). 
                                                                                                                                                        
models  is  that  one  need  only  make  reference  to  distributions.  Assuming  communication-sensitive  inequity 
aversion  destroys  that  virtue.  (ii)  If  there  is  incomplete  information  about  the  players'  degree  of  inequity 
aversion (which seems reasonable, and is in fact assumed in Fehr et al., 2002), then a principal’s behavior could 
be affected by a message that may signal the agent's ‘type’.  However, this could not affect the agent's behavior, 
which is our main focus.   
10 Segal & Sobel (1999) and Cox & Friedman (2002) present other approaches to modeling reciprocity. There 
are also models that combine distributional preferences and reciprocity; see Falk & Fischbacher (1998) and 
Charness & Rabin (2002).    12
Consider first the kindness of the principal when he chooses Yes.  The choice of Yes 
brings about a higher payoff to the agent than the choice of No, so Yes is kinder than No. 
However, the exact degree of kindness of Yes depends on the principal's beliefs.  Namely, the 
principal’s kindness when choosing Yes depends negatively on t'.  The logic is that the lower 
is t', the more money the principal believes she believes she gives to the agent, so the kinder 
she is. Now focus on the agent. To determine his preferred choice after the principal chooses 
Yes, the agent weighs his monetary incentives against his desire to be kind in return (by 
choosing e  = 1).  Since the principal’s kindness depends negatively on t', the lower the 
agent’s belief of t', the kinder the agent believes the principal is.  In other words, the lower t'' 
is, the kinder the agent believes the principal is.  Hence, the lower t'' is, the more ‘inclined’ 
the agent will be to be kind in return and choose e = 1.  
More  precisely,  the  model  includes  a  parameter  capturing  the  decision-maker's 
sensitivity to reciprocity.  The lower is t'', the lower the reciprocity-sensitivity need the agent 
have to prefer e = 1. Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger develop an equilibrium solution concept, 
which applied to our game here would pin down behavior and beliefs, dependent on the 
reciprocity-sensitivity  parameter.    In  this  paper,  however,  we  do  not  wish  to  invoke  any 
equilibrium  assumption  (cf.  our  remark  above).    Rather,  we  wish  to  derive  a  prediction 
concerning the agent's behavior, referring only to his utility function. 
We proceed as follows: First, we assume that the reciprocity-sensitivity differs among 
people.    This  assumption  seems  reasonable,  because  a  wealth  of  research  in  personality 
psychology suggests that individuals differ in their sensitivity to emotional concerns; see 
Krone (2002) for a general discussion.  Moreover, much experimental evidence indicates that 
different people have different motivations in similar situations.  Second, we assume that the 
reciprocity-sensitivity is independent of t''.  While this assumption is admittedly a bit stronger 
than one might like, we cannot observe the reciprocity-sensitivity parameter, and we invoke 
the assumption for lack of an obvious better alternative.  It is important to note that what 
follows hinges on this assumption.  Namely, the lower is t'' the more likely it is that a given 
person will prefer e = 1.  From the viewpoint of an outside observer (who does not know an 
individual’s sensitivity to reciprocity), a negative correlation between the likelihood of the e   13
= 1 choice and t'' is predicted.   Our experimental design allows us to measure t'' and to test 
this prediction. 
Communication may play a role when decision-makers are motivated by kindness-
based reciprocity.  Since motivation depends on beliefs, if communication can affect beliefs 
there will be a link from words to actions.  However, the link is subtle: Suppose the agent 
says "I promise to choose e = 1."  If the agent believes that the principal believes he is honest 
(so that t'' = 1), the previous arguments suggest that the agent must view the principal as less 
kind than if the agent said  "I promise to choose e = 0" (so that t'' = 0 if the agent believes the 
principal believes the agent is honest).  Thus, if the agent believes the principal believes him, 
he will have an incentive to renege!  Under kindness-based reciprocity, truth-telling is not 
self-enforcing. 
This  is  intriguing  and  somewhat  mind-boggling,  and  a  detailed  theoretical 
examination of communication among agents motivated by kindness-based reciprocity may 
prove to be rewarding research.  Here we avoid getting more deeply involved in the issue, 
and  simply  record  choices  and  beliefs  in  our  experiment  and  perform  statistical  tests 
regarding the correlation described above. 
 
Guilt Aversion 
The third social preference we consider is that decision-makers suffer from guilt if 
they believe they let others down, acting at variance with the expectations of people who 
have acted with decency.  Decision-makers therefore shy away from making such choices.  
We label such decision-makers ‘guilt averse’. 
There is a literature in social psychology that discusses closely-related ideas, although 
no mathematical modeling is done.  See, e.g., Baumeister, Stillwell & Heatherton (1994, 
1995)  who  (on  the  basis  of  autobiographical  narratives)  suggests  that  people  suffer  from 
'guilt' if they inflict harm on others.  One prominent way to inflict harm is to let others down.  
In  the  words  of  Baumeister  et  al.  (1995,  p.  173):  “Feeling  guilty  [is]  associated 
with...recognizing how a relationship partner's standards and expectations differ from one's 
own”.  It is such a sentiment we now propose to model and test.   14
This motivation makes sense in many settings, but simple as it may seem it calls for 
non-standard modeling.  Consider the following example, chosen to illustrate these points in 
the simplest possible way, rather than because of its immediate relevance to contract theory: 
Björn is prone to feel guilt if he lets others down. In restaurants, this influences 
his tipping behavior.  If the waitress does a decent job, the more he believes that the 
waitress believes she will receive as a tip, the more he will give. Björn gives precisely 
as much as he believes his waitress believes she will get, in order to avoid the feelings 
of guilt that will plague him if he gives less. (When Björn goes abroad, he inquires at 
the airport about ‘tipping customs’.) 
Perhaps surprisingly, conventional game theory cannot model Björn's motivation and 
behavior.  Consider a standard game where Björn (player 1) chooses a tip, and the waitress 
(player 2) has no choice (her strategy set is modeled as a singleton).  Björn's choice of tip 
determines  a  full  strategy  profile.    In  game  theory,  payoffs  are  defined  only  on  strategy 
profiles, so Björn's set of best choices must be independent of his belief of the waitress's 
belief.  This contradicts the example.  Hence, Björn's preferences cannot be described using 
conventional game theory; as in the case of kindness-based reciprocity, psychological game 
theory must be used. 
To make this clear, let t ³ 0 denote Björn's tip, t' denote the waitress's belief (her 
expectation of t) of the tip Björn will give her, and t'' denote Björn's belief (expectation) of t'.  
The assumption of guilt from letting the waitress down can be modeled such that Björn's 
utility following the strategy profile where he chooses tip t and believes t'' is 
 
- t - g×max{t''-t,0}, 
 
where g > 0 is a constant measuring Björn's sensitivity to guilt.  Björn's utility thus depends 
negatively on how much money he gives away, and on the extent to which he believes he 
does not live up to the waitress' expectations.  We make several observations: (i) This leads to 
a psychological game rather than a standard game, because although t determines a strategy 
profile, the payoff -t-g×max{t''-t, 0} is not a number but rather a function of t''; (ii) If g > 1,   15
Björn's optimal choice would be t = t''; (iii) Incorporating guilt this way implies a positive 
correlation between t and t''. 
The guilt-aversion concept can be applied in much the same way to the games in 
Figures 1 and 2.  Let t, t', and t'' be defined as in the case of kindness-based reciprocity.  
Guilt aversion can now be captured by assuming that the agent's utility following his choice e 




In Figure 3, the parameter g > 0 again scales the agent's guilt sensitivity.  If g is large 
enough,  and  if  the  agent  believes  sufficiently  strongly  that  the  principal  believes  he  will 
choose e = 1 (i.e., if t'' is large enough), then the inequality 14-gt'' < (5/6)×12+(1/6)×0 = 10. 
holds, and the agent will indeed choose e = 1.  Alternatively put, the lower is t'', the higher g 
must  be  in  order  for  the  agent  to  prefer  e  =  1.    If  g  differs  among  individuals  and  is 
independent of t'', there will be positive correlation between the likelihood of an e = 1 choice 
and t''.11  Note that the sign of the predicted correlation is the opposite of that we derived for 
kindness-based reciprocity.  
What is the role of communication in this connection?  As it turns out, it is quite 
remarkable. Again, communication may influence beliefs, beliefs influence motivation, and 
motivation  influences  behavior.    With  the  assumed  guilt  effect,  this  link  is  more 
straightforward than in the case of reciprocity, however.  Suppose the agent says "I promise 
to choose e = 1."  If the agent believes that the principal believes him, this will make the 
agent more inclined to choose e = 1.  This in turn gives the principal a reason to believe the 
agent's  statement.    For  an  agent  capable  of  feeling  guilty,  truth-telling  is  therefore  self-
enforcing.    By  issuing  a  promise  the  agent  can  gain  commitment  power  regarding  the 
exercise of his choice e = 1.12 
                                                 
11 Tangney (1995) asserts that ”there are stable individual differences in the degree to which people are prone to 
shame and guilt”. 
12 We focus on communication by the agent, but note that with an agent prone to feeling guilty the principal 
also has an incentive to indicate that he has high expectations. Similarly, in the tipping example, the waitress or   16
Both the principal and the agent gain relative to the (No, e = 1) outcome. A happy 
ending is brought about which reflects on Leith & Baumeister's (1998, p. 1) assertion that 
"guilt  serves  many  adaptive,  beneficial,  and  prosocial  functions",  and  that  "guilt  helps 
strengthen and maintain close relationships" (p. 2). 
Guilt  aversion  has  not  received  much  attention  by  scholars  working  on  social 
preferences,  but  related  ideas  appear  in  some  applied  theoretical  work  by  Huang  &  Wu 
(1994)  (on  remorse  in  corruption)  and  by  Dufwenberg  (2002)  (on  guilt  in  marriage).  
Experiments  by  Dufwenberg  &  Gneezy  (2000)  and  Bacharach,  Guerra  &  Zizzo  (2002) 
involve second-order belief-elicitation and findings in line with guilt aversion.  None of these 
studies deal with communication.13 
 
3. THE EXPERIMENT 
In this section we present the experimental design (3.1), state the formal hypotheses 
we shall test (3.2), and give the experimental results (3.3). 
 
3.1 Design 
The design of our experimental games corresponds to the games of Figures 1 and 2 in 
Section 2. The experimental instructions did not refer to game trees, and we used different 
labels  than  in Section  2  for  the  players  and  actions  (cf.  Appendix  A).   A  subject  in  the 
principal's  position  was  referred  to  as  person  ‘A’;  a  subject  in  the  agent's  position  was 
referred to as person ‘B’. Instead of Yes and No, the subjects chose IN or OUT.  Instead of e 
= 1 and e = 0, subjects chose to ROLL or DON'T ROLL a 6-sided die.  We use a one-shot 
design to avoid potential reputation and supergame issues.  
                                                                                                                                                        
the restaurant owners may have analogous incentives. For example, if Björn visited the Crab House restaurant at 
Pier 39 in San Francisco, his waitress would give him a plastic card which reads (in six languages): “Thank you 
for dining with us.  Many guests ask us about tipping. We want you to know that no additional tip or service 
charge has been added to your bill. In the United States, quality service is rewarded with a tip, or gratuity, of at 
least 15%.” 
13 Charness & Rabin (2001) consider a form of communications, asking first movers to express preferences 
between the moves available to responders.  They find strong evidence that responder behavior is sensitive to 
these expressed preferences (but only when the first mover has not ‘misbehaved’).  To the extent that expressed 
preferences are believed to be meaningful, they should affect responder behavior under an expectations-based 
model.  However, beliefs are not measured in this study.   17
The game was described using the following chart, which was presented to each of 
the participants: 
 
  A receives  B receives 
A chooses OUT  $5  $5 
A chooses IN, B chooses DON’T ROLL  $0  $14 
A chooses IN, B chooses ROLL, die = 1  $0  $10 
A chooses IN, B chooses ROLL, die = 2,3,4,5, or 6  $12  $10 
 
The treatment without messages began with each A choosing IN or OUT.  Next, each 
B indicated (without knowing A’s actual choice) whether he or she wished to choose ROLL 
or DON’T ROLL, contingent upon A having chosen IN, as B’s choice is immaterial if A has 
chosen OUT.  We thus obtain an observation for every B.14  The outcome corresponding to a 
successful project occurred if and only if the die came up 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 after a ROLL choice.   
In the message treatment, each B had an option to send a non-binding message to A 
prior to A’s decision concerning IN or OUT.  Each B received a sheet, on which any (non-
identifying) message could be written, if desired.  B could also decline to send a message by 
circling the letter B at the top of the otherwise-blank sheet.15  
Participants were recruited at UCSB by sending out an e-mail message to the campus 
community.  We conducted six sessions, three where messages were feasible and three where 
they were not. Sessions were conducted in a large classroom that was divided into two sides 
by a center aisle, and people were seated at spaced intervals.  The number of participants in a 
session ranged from 24 to 36, with 90 people in the sessions without communication and 84 
people in the sessions with communication; each person could only participate in one of these 
sessions.  Average earnings were $16, including a $5 show-up fee; each session was one hour 
in duration.   
                                                 
14 Although somewhat controversial, this strategy method of elicitation (Selten 1967) is used extensively in 
experimental economics and may be best suited to games with few decision nodes.  
15 The law distinguishes between written (legally binding) and verbal contracts; this might be relevant for 
certain written messages, like promises.  In the experiment all written statements were non-binding, thus in the 
(legal) spirit of verbal promises.  It was not feasible to have verbal promises without sacrificing anonymity.   18
A coin was tossed to determine which side of the room was A (principal) and which 
side was B (agent).  Identification numbers were shuffled and passed out face down, and 
participants were informed that these numbers would be used to determine pairings (one A 
with one B) and to track their decisions.  After answering questions, the experimenter chose 
individuals at random to state the outcome for all possible cases, starting when it seemed 
clear that everyone understood the rules.  After the decisions had been collected, a 6-sided die 
was rolled for each agent; this was made clear to the participants in advance, to avoid the 
anticipated loss of public anonymity for agents who chose DON’T ROLL.  This roll was 
determinative if and only if (IN, ROLL) had been chosen.  
As explained earlier, the motivation for our experiment made it crucial to measure 
some of the subjects' beliefs.  After we collected the decisions made, we passed out decision 
sheets that invited participants to make guesses about the choices of their counterparts, and 
offered to reward good guesses. A’s were asked to guess the proportion of B’s who chose 
ROLL.16  B’s were asked to guess the average guess made by A’s who chose IN. If a guess 
was within five percentage points of the realization, we rewarded the guesser with $5 (we 
also told participants that we would pay $5 for all B guesses if no A’s had chosen IN).   
We chose this belief-elicitation protocol mainly because it is simple and rather easy to 
describe in instructions. This form of belief elicitation sharpens the incentives in comparison 
with quadratic-scoring rules, at the cost of the exclusion of (rational) guesses of less than 5% 
or greater than 95%.  As our game is one-shot and we don’t mention guesses until after 




                                                 
16 We did not ask A’s to guess the likelihood that the paired B would choose ROLL, as we don’t observe this 
likelihood.  The observed binary choice would make this simply a Yes or No guess.   19
The numbering 1-4 of the hypotheses below reflects the connection to the questions 
Q1 – Q4 listed in the introduction. 
If an agent has purely selfish preferences, it is a dominant strategy to to choose zero 
effort when effort is not observable.  Anticipating this, the principal will reject the contract.  
With respect to Q1, this leads to: 
H1: No agent chooses high effort with hidden action.  No principal ever accepts the 
contract. 
  In accordance with findings in many experimental studies, where many people seem 
not to maximize own money, it is not unreasonable to expect that H1 might be rejected.  In 
that case, the remaining hypotheses presented below come into play.  With regard to Q2, we 
have: 
H2:  The  possibility  of  communication  will  increase  neither  the  proportion  of 
principals accepting contracts nor the proportion of agents who choose high effort.  
(IN, ROLL) outcomes are not more common when messages are feasible. 
  Regarding Q3, the form and content of communication, we examine this issue by 
classifying  the  messages  into  different  categories,  and  by  considering  how  the  agents’ 
behavior  and  the  outcomes  correlate  with  these  categories.    Of  course,  it  is  in  principle 
possible to cut the classification boundaries in a large number of ways.17  Our categorization 
is tailored to fit the specific social preferences models we test (cf. section 2.3 above and 
hypothesis H4(a) and H4(b) below). Recall, in particular, the idea, discussed in section 2.3, 
that with belief-dependent utility (kindness-based reciprocity or guilt aversion) the agent may 
wish to convey a message about his intentions to the principal. Against this background, our 
classification keeps track of messages that include a 'statement of intent'. 
More specifically, the classification takes the following perspective: An agent may or 
may not send a message; if he does send a message, it may or may not contain an affirmative 
                                                 
17 It is common in social psychology to code responses according to various classifications. While we only 
consider the classification in the text, we provide (in Appendix B) the complete messages for those readers who 
wish  to  consider  alternative  coding.  Some  of  the  messages  are  rather  colorful,  and  serve  well  to  enliven 
proceedings in seminars. Consider, e.g., message 7 in session 3, which contains a poem by Samuel Francis 
Smith and fictitious references to desires and advice from some famous persons....   20
statement concerning his intention to behave in a manner favorable to the principal.  We 
consider whether we can discern patterns of agent and principal behavior according to these 
categories.  Our null hypothesis on this point is: 
H3: Neither the proportion of principals accepting contracts nor the proportion of 
agents choosing high effort will be increased if a message is sent or whether a sent 
message contains a statement of intent (a promise).  
Our final question (Q4) concerns the types of motivational forces that are able to 
organize the data well. We focus on the three approaches discussed in Section 3 and the 
testable predictions derived there. 
The distributional models of Bolton & Ockenfels and Fehr & Schmidt predict that 
communication does not matter.  This implication again suggests testing H2, but in order to 
make clear the conceptual motivation and connection to Q4 we state a separate hypothesis:  
H4(a): Same statement as H2.  
The other two approaches discussed in Section 3 were kindness-based reciprocity and 
guilt aversion.  We derived correlations of opposite sign between the frequency of high-effort 
choices and agents' beliefs concerning principals' beliefs concerning the agents' high-effort 
choices.   Our experimental design allows us to measure the agents’ second-order beliefs, so 
we can test these predictions.  The following hypothesis is relevant in both cases: 
H4(b):  There  is  no  correlation  between  the  agent's  expectation  of  the  principal's 
expectation of a favorable response and the frequency of trustworthy responses in the 
experiment. 
If  kindness-based  reciprocity  were  important  for  cooperation,  we  would  expect  to 
reject H4(b) in favor of the alternative hypothesis with negative correlation; if guilt aversion 
were important for cooperation, we would expect to reject H4(b) in favor of the alternative 
hypothesis with positive correlation. 
We now turn to an examination of our results in light of these hypotheses. 
   21
3.3 Results 
Figure  4  summarizes  principal  and  agent  choices.    These  data  are  needed  to  test 
hypotheses H1, H2, and H4(a). To test the other hypotheses requires some additional data (on 
message  classification,  and  elicited  beliefs),  which  we  introduce  later.    Complete 














    In  the  no-communication  treatment,  20/45  (44%)  of  B’s  choose  to  ROLL;  this 
compares to 28/42 (67%) in the communication treatment.  A’s were more likely to choose 
IN in the communication treatment, 31/42 (74%) to 25/45 (56%).  The (IN, ROLL) choice 
occurred 20% of the time (9 of 45 pairs) without communication, compared to 50% (21 of 42 
pairs) with communication. 
 
H1:  This  is  the  classical  hypothesis;  we  can  readily  reject  it  for  both  the  no-
communication  and  communication  treatments,  for  both  principals  and  agents.    For  the 
principals, the test of the difference of proportions (see Glasnapp & Poggio, 1985) gives Z = 
5.88 and 7.01 for the respective treatments, with p < 0.000001; for the agents, this test gives Z   22
= 5.07 and 6.48, with similarly high statistical significance.  Own monetary reward is not the 
only motivation present. 
   
H2:  This  hypothesis  states  that  the  possibility  of  communication  will  not  affect 
behavior.    We  can  reject  it  for  both  principals  and  agents.    In  the  no-communication 
treatment,  55.6%  A’s  chose  IN,  while  in  the  communication  treatment  this  proportion 
increased to 73.8%.  The test of the difference of proportions gives a test statistic of Z = 1.78, 
with significance at p = 0.038.18  Without communication 44.4% B’s chose ROLL, while 
with communication this proportion increased by half to 66.7%.  The test of the difference of 
proportions gives a test statistic of Z = 2.08, with significance at p = 0.019.  The likelihood of 
a successful partnership more than doubles, and the test of proportions gives Z = 2.94, p = 
0.002.  We may conclude that messages have a major influence on behavior. 
 
H3: This hypothesis concerns whether we can find ex post patterns of behavior that 
depend on the particular content of a message.  Specifically, does a statement of intent affect 
behavior and the resulting outcomes?  One of the features of our design is that messages can 
have  nearly  any  form.    Nevertheless,  we  can  group  the  agents’  message  choices  into 
categories and see if certain types of messages are more effective than others.  Appendix B 
presents the precise messages sent by the agents, and shows how we  have classified the 
choices into three categories: promises, empty talk, and no message.19  24 of the 42 agents 
(57%) made promises to ROLL; 14 agents (33%) wrote messages not containing a statement 
of intent, and four agents (10%) sent no message.   
We can readily reject H3 for principal behavior with communication, and reject the 
hypothesis more marginally for agent behavior.  22 of the 24 principals (92%) who received 
promises chose  IN.  This compares to eight of the 14 principals (57%) who received an 
empty-talk message, or nine of the 18 principals (50%) who did not receive a promise.  The 
                                                 
18 Except where otherwise indicated, we use one-tailed tests to reflect our ex ante directional hypotheses. 
19 We distinguish between promises and empty talk by characterizing a promise as an affirmative statement on 
one’s intention or plan to behave in a manner favorable to the principal.     23
differences in principal behavior are quite significant: Z = 2.52, p = 0.006 and Z = 3.04, p = 
0.001  for  the  respective  promise/empty  talk  and  promise/no  promise  comparisons.    With 
respect to agents’ behavior, eighteen of the 24 promises (75%) were actually kept (the agent 
chose ROLL).  (Note that the remaining 25% communicated a more or less outspoken lie.)  
This compares with only seven of the 14 empty-talk agents (50%) choosing ROLL, or 10 of 
the 18 non-promising agents overall.  Comparing the ROLL rate with a promise to the rate 
with empty talk or non-promises overall, we see that the difference is weakly significant (Z = 
1.57, p = 0.06, or Z = 1.32, p = 0.10, respectively). 
We can also compare across treatments to see if not promising in the communication 
treatment  (where  promising  is  possible)  yields  the  same  outcomes  as  in  the  no-
communication treatment (where it is not).  Regarding agent behavior, neither the 7/14 ROLL 
rate nor the 10/18 ROLL rate is significantly different than the 20/45 ROLL rate in the no-
communication treatment (Z = 0.36 and 0.80, for the respective comparisons).  Similarly, for 
principal behavior, the 8/14 or 9/18 IN rates with empty talk or non-promises are nearly the 
same as the 25/45 IN rate in the no-communication treatment (Z = 0.10 and 0.40, for the 
respective comparisons). 
It  is  instructive  to  consider  the  outcomes  achieved  with  and  without  promises  by 
agents  in  the  communication  treatment.    When  a  promise  was  made,  the  successful 
partnership outcome (IN, ROLL) resulted in 67% of the cases (16/24).  This compares to 
28% successful outcomes (5/18) for non-promises, and an expected rate of 25% in the no-
communication  treatment.20    It  seems  clear  that  the  observed  difference  between 
communication  and  no-communication  treatments  is  driven  not  by  messages  per  se,  but 
rather by the promises made by agents. 
There is a literature on self-serving deception in (signaling or bargaining) games with 
asymmetric  information.    These  studies  typically  differ  crucially  from  ours  in  that  the 
monetary  payoff  structure  of  the  game  is  not  common  information.    It  is  nevertheless 
                                                 
20 The average (Principal, Agent) earnings were (7.08, 10.58) with promises, (5.28, 8.39) with non-promises, 
and (4.69, 9.01) in the no-communication treatment. Both principals and agents earn more when a promise is 
made.  The average total payoffs of 17.66, 13.67, and 13.70 translate to efficiency rates of 76.6%, 36.7%, and 
37.0%, considering that the minimum total payoff is 10 and the expected maximum is 20.   24
interesting to note that certain aspects of the results compare well.  The tendency of agents to 
not  break  promises  in  our  setting  meshes  well  with  Gneezy's  (2002)  finding  that  people 
experience  a  cost  of  lying  and  the  Brandts  &  Charness  (2003)  result  that  people  dislike 
deception  per  se.    Nevertheless,  these  and  several  other  studies  show  that  many  people 
engage in deception, much like those six participants in our design who made a promise that 
they did not keep.21 
 
H4(a): Distributional models predict that communication does not influence behavior 
(or at least an agent’s behavior; cf. footnote 9).  We already know that this prediction does 
not stand, because the hypothesis H4(a) has the same content as the rejected hypothesis H2.  
Distributional  models  appear  to  be  inadequate  for  addressing  the  observed  impact  of 
communication. 
 
H4(b): How well do kindness-based reciprocity and guilt do in explaining our belief-
action data?  Recall that if reciprocity matters we expect to reject the hypothesis in favor of 
the alternative with negative correlation, while if guilt aversion is the motivation, we expect a 
positive correlation. 
In  the  no-communication  case,  agents  who  chose  DON’T  ROLL  guessed  that 
principals who chose IN guessed on average that 40.4% of agents would ROLL, compared to 
the 53.2% guessed by the B’s who chose ROLL.  A Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney rank-sum test 
(see Siegel & Castellan, 1988) finds that the guesses of the ROLL group are significantly 
higher (Z  = 1.99, p = 0.046, two-tailed test).  This gap across agents widens considerably in 
the communication treatment, where agents who chose DON’T ROLL guessed 45.1% and 
agents who chose ROLL guessed 73.2% (Z = 3.20, p = 0.001, two-tailed test). Thus H4(b) is 
rejected in favor of the alternative hypothesis with positive correlation, consistent with guilt 
aversion.  
                                                 
21  See  Blume,  DeJong,  Kim  &  Sprinkle  (2001),  Forsythe,  Lundholm  &  Rietz  (1999),  Boles,  Croson  & 
Murnighan (2000), and Croson, Boles & Murnighan (forthcoming).  Croson (2002) reviews the results.   25
An examination of agent choices as a function of guesses about the guess of those 
principals  who  chose  IN  confirms  the  positive  relationship  between  agent  choices  and 
second-order beliefs.  This is shown in Figures 5 and 6: 
   


























There is a definite positive trend in both cases; the more likely that an agent who 
believes that the principal expects him to ROLL is generally more likely to choose ROLL.  
This tendency is much more pronounced when communication is possible. 
There is some interaction between our results on guesses about guesses and the earlier 
results on promises (cf. H3).  In particular, agents who make a promise and choose ROLL 
exhibit higher guesses about principals' guesses than do other agents (Z = 1.70, p = 0.045,   26
one-tailed Wilcoxon test).  A possible interpretation is that promises foster high expectations, 
which coupled with guilt aversion creates a commitment device for agents to ROLL. 
 
  4. DISCUSSION   
We  present  experimental  evidence  concerning  behavior  and  motivation in  a  game 
designed  to  capture  the  essence  of  hidden  action,  as  treated  in  much  of  contract  theory.  
Hidden action turns out to be less of a stumbling block in the lab than classical contract 
theory  predicts,  and  communication  within  the  partnership  mitigates  the  problem  further.  
‘Statements of intent’ by agents seem particularly responsible for the benefits observed. Such 
promises dramatically affect the behavior of both principals and agents, resulting in a much 
higher proportion of successful partnerships. 
Why do these results hold?  What model of decision-making captures the relevant 
effects?  The questions should be probed, since the answers inform subsequent research.  To 
know which motivational forces are at work and why and how communication influences the 
interaction  is  essential  for  deriving  insights  regarding  optimal  contracting,  and  for 
formulating  testable  predictions  in  other  settings  to  which  the  results  may  extend.    We 
examine whether several approaches to modeling social preferences in games can explain our 
findings. 
We first look at models in which decision-makers care only about the overall final 
distribution of monetary payoffs in a game, focusing in particular on the Bolton & Ockenfels 
and Fehr & Schmidt models of inequity aversion.  These models are relatively simple to 
define, to test empirically, and to apply theoretically.  One may therefore wish to use them 
even if they only get predictions approximately right (cf. Fehr, Klein & Schmidt, 2001, p. 9).  
Nevertheless, it is important to assess the range of situations for which such an approach 
makes sense.  We check whether the models come close to capturing how communication 
influences strategic interaction in a setting with hidden action.  The answer is negative; in the 
game  we  consider,  distributional  models  predict  that  communication  does  not  matter,  a 
proposition that our data clearly refute.  Distributional models can explain the behavior seen   27
in  either  the  no-communication  or  the  communication  treatment,  but  cannot  explain  the 
behavioral differentials across treatments. 
This finding leads us to address more complicated models, based on psychological 
game  theory  in  which  decision-makers  have  belief-dependent  utilities.  We  consider  two 
models in particular: kindness-based reciprocity and guilt aversion.  These models imply that 
the  likelihood  of  the  agent's  high-effort  choice  is  correlated  with  his  belief  about  the 
principal's belief of that choice.  That correlation is predicted to be negative with reciprocity 
and  positive  with  guilt  aversion;  thus,  our  data  speak  in  favor  of  the  guilt-aversion 
explanation.  The stronger an agent believes that his principal believes that the agent will 
make  the  high-effort  choice,  the  more  likely  the  agent  is  to  do  this  (not  less  likely,  as 
kindness-based reciprocity would have it). 
We have three comments.  First, our case for rejecting kindness-based reciprocity is 
weaker  than  meets  the  eye,  because  it  relies  on  an  auxiliary  assumption  that  may  be 
unjustified.    As  explained  in  section  3.2,  we  assume  independence  between  the  agent's 
reciprocity-sensitivity (as expressed by a certain parameter in Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger's 
theory) and his degree of belief that his principal believes that the agent will make the high-
effort choice (t'').  We have little justification for this assumption, beyond lack of obvious 
alternative, so our rejection of kindness-based reciprocity should be taken with a grain of salt.  
More research, aimed at revealing why beliefs (such as t'') come about, is clearly needed. 
Second,  our  result,  insofar  it  is  valid,  only  concerns  positive  kindness-based 
reciprocity  and  guilt  aversion  when  the  principal  made  a  choice  favorable  to  the  agent.  
Reciprocity has two sides, positive reciprocity, where a player is kind in return to another’s 
kind choice, and negative reciprocity, where a player is unkind in return to another’s unkind 
choice.  In our game, the only way the principal can be unkind is by not agreeing to the 
partnership.  In that case the agent has no subsequent choice, so we cannot observe negative 
reciprocity.    In  fact,  negative  reciprocity  seems  an  important  motivational  force  in  other 
games.22  In addition, the fact that preference expression in Charness & Rabin (2001) is 
                                                 
22 A proper test of negative reciprocity should involve belief measurement, since the relevant theory involves 
belief-dependent  utilities.  It  is  nevertheless  worth  noting  that  numerous  experimental  studies  suggest  that   28
completely  ineffective  after  unfavorable  play  by  the  first  mover  strongly  suggests  that 
expectations-based models have little or no bite in negative contexts. 
Third, using guilt aversion instead of kindness-based reciprocity as the underlying 
motivation  for  cooperative  behavior  does  not  imply  disregard  of  previous  experimental 
findings.  Rather, it is a reinterpretation of these findings that is suggested.  For example, 
results  in  gift-exchange  games  as  well  as  in  trust  games  are  usually  taken  to  illustrate 
reciprocal forces at work (see Fehr & Gächter, 2000).  We propose that guilt aversion be 
considered a serious candidate for understanding the results.  This would mean that the more 
effort a ‘worker’ expects that his ‘firm’ expects him to exert, the more effort he will choose if 
the firm has offered a decent wage, because if he did not he would feel guilty letting the firm 
down.  If firms believe that higher wages trigger higher effort, and agents believe this, the 
oft-observed  positive  wage-effort  relationship  will  result.    Another  example  could  be  the 
investment  game  studied  by  Berg,  Dickhaut  &  McCabe  (1995).    Given  the  evidence 
consistent  with  guilt  aversion  in  other  ‘trust’  games  (this  study;  Dufwenberg  &  Gneezy, 
2000; Bacharach et al., 2001), it would seem quite plausible that guilt aversion also underlies 
the Berg et al. (1995) findings. 
An  intriguing  aspect  of  guilt  aversion  is  its  potential  as  a  theory  of  why 
communication matters.  Our design permits us to elicit certain beliefs (about actions and 
beliefs), and leads us to conclude that trustworthy behavior by agents is consistent with their 
desire to live up to the expectations of the principal with whom they are matched.23  This 
suggests  a  plausible  channel  through  which  non-binding  communication  may  influence 
behavior.  By making a promise to behave in a trustworthy fashion, the agent strengthens the 
                                                                                                                                                        
negative  reciprocity  is  important  (Kahneman,  Knetsch  &  Thaler,  1986;  Blount,  1995;  Charness,  1996; 
Offerman, 2002; Brandts & Charness, 1999; Andreoni, Brown & Vesterlund, 2002; Kagel & Wolfe, 2001; 
Charness & Rabin, 2002) and a handful of studies that suggest that positive reciprocity is not (Charness, 1996; 
Offerman, 2002; Cox, 2000; Charness & Rabin, 2002).  
23 We note that promises may matter more when the party making a promise knows that the other party will 
find out whether the promise is kept (which may still be consistent with a hidden-action environment, if these 
facts are not provable in court).  In this respect, there is an issue of whether internal norms or external norms 
drive the behavioral effect.  Is there a difference between conforming to internal norms (one’s view of what is 
appropriate) or external norms (the expectations of one’s counterpart)?  Charness & Grosskopf (2000) consider 
the  interplay  between  cheap  talk  and  such  information  provision,  and  find  that  providing  information 
substantially enhances the degree of coordination on the payoff-dominant equilibrium.  This seems to be a 
worthwhile topic for future research.   29
principal's degree of belief that the agent can be relied upon, and the agent's own belief that 
the principal reacts this way creates an incentive for him to live up to his promise.24  A 
promise  feeds  a  beneficial,  self-fulfilling  circle  of  beliefs,  beliefs  about  beliefs,  and 
trustworthy behavior. Truth-telling becomes ‘self-enforcing’; in a trust situation there will be 
no  incentive  to  lie  or  renege  on  a  promise.  (As  noted  in  Section  2.3,  kindness-based 
reciprocity does not possess such ‘honesty-sustaining’ features.) 
Guilt aversion thus suggests a reason why people may experience a cost of lying, 
which make them keep promises, or avoid stating falsehoods.  Gneezy (2002) models lying as 
having an individual-specific (but otherwise constant across circumstances) internal positive 
cost,  and shows that this has explanatory value in a deception experiment.  Our findings 
suggest that these costs may depend on one’s beliefs about whether a promise, or a lie, was 
believed by the person to whom it was made.  These belief-dependent costs of guilt may, 
however, extend beyond promises and lies.  Why and how do people discuss, argue, and 
debate?  How do such exchanges influence group decisions, formation of and adherence to 
social norms, partnership formation, and contracting?  Perhaps a key  aspect is that these 
exchanges lead up to commonly-expected standards of behavior or judgment which, once in 
place, are shared and not violated by guilt-averse people. 
This suggests a promising lode to explore in future research.  Communication and 
guilt aversion may be important not only in simple mono-contractual settings with hidden 
action,  but  also  in  other  partnership  situations  involving  hidden  information,  multiple 
contracts, or richer strategic possibilities.  First, one might explore various variations close to 
our chosen design, to explore the robustness of our findings.  What is the impact on behavior 
and  beliefs  of,  for  example,  varying  details  of  the  communication  protocol,  say,  having 
messages from the principal or having interactive responses between principals and agents?25  
                                                 
24 This insight for a psychological game is reminiscent of ideas explored in the literature on cheap talk in 
standard games; see Farrell & Rabin (1996) and Crawford (1998) for surveys, and Jamison (2000) for a recent 
model. 
25  Comparison  with  related  work  on  other  games  is  then  possible.  For  example,  a  form  of  one-sided 
communication by principals appears in some recent gift-exchange studies: firms offer contracts consisting of 
wage and desired effort; see Fehr, Gächter & Kirchsteiger (1997), Fehr & Gächter (2002), and Fehr, Klein & 
Schmidt (2001).  The last two studies report positive correlations between desired and actual effort (though not   30
Second,  one  may  consider  settings  plagued  by  hidden  information.    One  may 
reasonably  suspect  that  again  communication  fosters  cooperation.    Agents  might  say,  "I 
promise I am a person with high talent", and perhaps guilt-averse people with low talent find 
it  unbearable  to  lie  about  such  matters.    Examining  this  proposition  could  shed  light  on 
whether or not hidden information is more or less problematic than hidden action.  
Third, there is ample scope for theoretical work.  Contract theory has a history of 
basking  in  the  light  of  tremendous  intellectual  achievement.    That  tradition  should  be 
continued.  As experimentalists accumulate insights regarding which behavioral ideas that 
seem to have bearing on understanding partnerships and contract, it makes sense to develop 
new  theory  based  on  these  ideas.    How  might  one,  for  example,  characterize  optimal 
contractual  arrangements  when  agents  are  affected  by  guilt  aversion?    To  answer  this 
question seems to us an exciting challenge in behavioral contract theory. 
Although more work is needed to delineate more exactly the range of situations in 
which  guilt  aversion  plays  a  role,26  we  propose  that  the  idea  be  seriously  considered  as 
fundamental for understanding partnerships, contracts, and human interaction quite generally.  
Examples  range  from  everyday  experiences,  like  tipping  in  a  café,  to  many  kinds  of 
partnerships, including husband & wife, lawyer & client, procurement agency & contracted 
firm,  inventor  &  producer,  talented  young  golfer  &  rich  sponsor,  co-owners  of  firms, 
employer & employee, etc. To underscore the potential scope of the idea, we close our paper 
by sketching out in somewhat more detail one specific application, drawn from industrial 
organization rather than classical contract theory. 
A particular kind of partnership where promises may play a role is a cartel.  We first 
note  a  paradox:  Against  the  backdrop  of  conventional  economic  theory,  selfish  decision-
makers and irrelevant promises, the modern competition law that prohibits certain ‘concerted 
practices’  among  firm  appears  superfluous.    In  order  to  fine  companies,  a  common 
                                                                                                                                                        
always significant).  Beliefs were not measured, but the findings seem to rhyme rather well with guilt-aversion 
predictions, if statements of desired effort shape beliefs and beliefs about beliefs. 
26 Clearly that is not always the case; it is hard, e.g., to imagine poker players feeling guilty, no matter how they 
deceive others. On the other hand, if a social norm (or expectation) is perceived to be more pervasive (‘tighter’), 
perhaps a greater degree of adherence will result from guilt aversion. Another issue concerns expectations that 
may be deemed ‘unreasonable’ or ‘obnoxious’. How would this be determined, and what might be the effect?   31
prerequisite is that contacts between company representatives have been documented (e.g., 
meetings  prior  to  price  changes;  see  Hovenkamp,  1996).    Agreements  made  during  such 
contacts can hardly build on much else but promises, since cartel agreements are illegal and 
will not be enforced in court.   
If an oral contract is not worth the paper it's written on, one may wonder if the rules 
against concerted practices are necessary!27  The skeptical view of oral contracts stands in 
some  contrast  to  findings  in  experimental  industrial  organization,  which  suggest  that 
communication may foster collusion; see the survey by Holt (1995, pp. 409-11).  We have 
shown  that  communication  may  matter  in  a  different  context,  and  point  to  a  specific 
motivational force that may be responsible.  In a competition context, it is conceivable that an 
‘oral contract’, under which guilt-averse cartelists promise one another to stick to monopoly 
pricing, serves as the glue that makes cartelists stick together.  The experiment in this paper is 
not concerned with a competition game, so we shall not push the example further, but merely 
propose  the  matter  for  further  research.    Experiments  could  investigate  how  promises, 
discussions, agreements, and other forms of information exchange influence beliefs, beliefs 
about beliefs, competition in markets, and the ability of cartelists to collude.  
 
 
                                                 
27  Some  economists  have  made  claims  that  go  even  further.    McCutcheon  (1997)  claims  that  these  rules 
actually foster collusion.  It is the combination of the game-theoretic notion of renegotiation-proof equilibrium, 
the idea that the competitors are completely selfish, and the assumption that competition law makes discussions 
among firms somewhat more costly that produce this effect. In McCutcheon's model, firms lie without remorse, 
and a victim of such a ploy would enthusiastically and perpetually re-negotiate with the competitor who fooled 
him.   32
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APPENDIX A - INSTRUCTIONS 
[text in the message treatment is shown in brackets] 
 
Thank you for participating in this session.  The purpose of this experiment is to study 
how people make decisions in a particular situation.  Feel free to ask us questions as they 
arise, by raising your hand.  Please do not speak to other participants during the experiment.   
You will receive $5 for participating in this session.  You may also receive additional 
money, depending on the decisions made (as described below).  Upon completion of the 
session, this additional amount will be paid to you individually and privately. 
  During the session, you will be paired with another person.  However, no participant 
will ever know the identity of the person with whom he or she is paired.   
 
Decision tasks 
In each pair, one person will have the role of A, and the other will have the role of B.  
The amount of money you earn depends on the decisions made in your pair.  
 
On  the  designated  decision  sheet,  each  person  A  will  indicate  whether  he  or  she 
wishes to choose IN or OUT.  If A chooses OUT, A and B each receives $5.  We will collect 
these sheets after the choices have been indicated.  Next, each person B will indicate whether 
he or she wishes to choose ROLL or DON’T ROLL (a die).  Note that B will not know 
whether A has chosen IN or OUT; however, since B’s decision will only make a difference 
when A has chosen IN, we ask B’s to presume  (for the purpose of making this decision) that 
A has chosen IN. 
 
If A has chosen IN and B chooses DON’T ROLL, then B receives $14 and A receives 
$0.  If B chooses ROLL, B receives $10 and rolls a six-sided die to determine A’s payoff.  If 
the die comes up 1, A receives $0; if the die comes up 2-6, A receives $12.  (All of these 
amounts are in addition to the $5 show-up fee.)  This information is summarized in the chart 
below: 
 
  A receives  B receives 
A chooses OUT  $5  $5 
A chooses IN, B chooses DON’T ROLL  $0  $14 
A chooses IN, B chooses ROLL, die = 1  $0  $10 
A chooses IN, B chooses ROLL, die = 2,3,4,5, or 6  $12  $10 
 
[A Message 
Prior to the decision by A and B concerning IN or OUT, B has an option to send a 
message to A.  Each B receives a blank sheet, on which a message can be written, if desired.  
We will allow time as needed for people to write messages, then these will be collected.  
Please print clearly if you wish to send a message to A. 
 
In these messages, no one is allowed to identify him or herself by name or number or gender 
or  appearance.    (The  experimenter  will  monitor  the  messages.    Violations  (experimenter 
discretion) will result in B receiving only the $5 show-up fee, and the paired A receiving the 
average amount received by other A’s.)  Other than these restrictions, B may say anything 
that he or she wishes in this message.  If you wish to not send a message, simply circle the 












MAKE A GUESS 
 
 
We now ask you to guess the percentage of B’s who chose ROLL.  
 
 





Payment for the guess  
 
If your guess differs by no more than 5 percentage points from the actual percentages, 
you will receive $5.00. 
 
If your guess differs by more than 5 percentage points from the actual percentages, 
you will receive $0. 
 




MAKE A GUESS 
 
 
We have asked A’s to make guesses about the percentages of B’s who chose ROLL.  




For A’s who chose IN, I guess that the average guess about 
the percentage of B’s who chose ROLL is ______%.  




Payment for guess:  
 
If your guess differs by no more than 5 percentage points from the actual percentages, 
you will receive $5.00. 
 
If your guess differs by more than 5 percentage points from the actual percentages, 
you will receive $0. 
 
(If there are no A’s who chose IN, you will be paid $5.00 for your guess, regardless of 
your answer.)   41
APPENDIX B  - MESSAGES 
 
In this table:  P = Promise, E = Empty Talk, N = No Message, R = ROLL, DR = DON’T 
ROLL 
 
Sess.  ID   Message  Class  Action  Principal 
1  1  Please choose In so we can get paid more.  E  DR  OUT 
1  2  Choose in, I will roll dice, you are 5/6 likely to get 2,3,4,5, or 6 ® $12.  
This way both of us will win something. 
P  DR  IN 
1  3  If you stay in, the chances of the die coming up other than 1 are 5 in 6 
– pretty good.  Otherwise, we’d both be stuck at $5. (If you opt out) 
E  DR  IN 
1  4  I have to do laundry tonight and I really don’t want to do it!  But I 
don’t have any clean underwear left and I don’t want to go commando 
tommorrow.  We’ll see what I decide tonight.  This man acts funny 
doesn’t he?  But he seems cool, he’s quite a character.  All this mystery 
is kinda cool.   
E  R  OUT 
1  5  If you will choose “In”, I will choose to roll.  This way, we both have 
an opportunity to make more than $5! ￿ 
P  R  IN 
1  6    N  R  OUT 
1  7  If I roll a 2-6 (you’ll know when you receive the $, you will give $5.00 
to a stranger.   
 





You’ll still be gaining more than if I had chosen Don’t roll. 
P  R  IN 
1  8  The fairest thing to do is if you opt “IN”.  Then I will proceed to 
choose “roll.”  That way you and I have 5/6 chances to make money 
for the both of us.  That’s much better than just making $5 each.  
Increases both our chances.  Thanks. 
P  R  IN 
1  9  Choose In and I will Roll  You have my word  P  DR  IN 
1  10  Good luck 
I do not know what I’m going to do, so I have no hints on how to 
advise you on choosing “in” or “out.”  Though it would be beneficial 
for me to pick don’t roll and hope you pick “in”, I also like to give you 
a chance to gain some cash.  Who knows? 
E  R  IN 
1  11  What’s up?  Good luck on your decision.  Choose whatever.  If you 
choose “out,” you get only $10 total.  If you choose “In,” you can get 
$17 total instead of only $10.  7 bucks is a lot of money! 
E  DR  IN 
1  12  Hey.  OK I think that the best way for both of us to make a profit is for 
you to choose IN and for me to roll.  That way we both make some 
money.  There’s no point in me not rolling because that would give 
you and me less profit.  So I’m a roller if you’re in ￿. 
P  DR  IN 
1  13  take a risk  E  R  IN 
1  14  If you choose IN the first round and then I will choose Don’t Roll at 
first.  I will get $14 but then after that I will choose roll each time after 
the 1
st role.  Chances are most likely you will get $12 and I will get 
only $10.  I will the only take 7 rolls for you to get even with me.  That 
way we both leave with a good amount of money.  Hope you have a 
great evening and that this works out for both of us. ￿ 
E  R  OUT   42
1  15  If you choose in I’ll roll. 
Why?  If you choose out, we walk out with $10 each.  If you choose IN 
& I choose IN then both of us coin.  So it’s a compromise.  By 
agreeing to this I guarantee myself more $ than risking you choose out.  
So if you choose out I get $10 ($5 diff.)  if you choose in I get $15 vs. 
$19 ($4 diff.).  that’s why 
P  R  IN 
1  16    N  DR  OUT 
1  17    N  R  OUT 
1  18  Choose “In” so we can both make some $$  What are the chances me 
rolling a 1?  I’ll try my best. 
P  R  IN 
           
2  1  I’m going to roll.  P  R  OUT 
2  2  I’ll choose roll.  P  R  IN 
2  3  I will choose roll.  P  DR  IN 
2  4  I’m going to choose roll  P  R  IN 
2  5  choose in, & I’ll roll.  P  R  IN 
2  6  You can have the 2 extra dollars.  I’ll be nice and choose to roll.  ￿  P  R  IN 
2  7    N  R  IN 
2  8  Hey, choose in and I will roll.  You have to like your odds that I will 
roll a 2,3,4,5, or 6.  5/6 odds ain’t bad. 
P  DR  IN 
2  9  If you choose “In”, I’ll choose Roll and you’ve got a 5/6 chance of 
getting $12. 
P  R  IN 
2  10  Stay IN, I really need the money.  E  R  IN 
2  11  If you choose IN, and I roll, the chances of our getting the most $ are 
very high.  The likelyhood of my rolling a 1 is small compared to the 
chances of rolling a 2-6.  So we both get cash. 
E  DR  OUT 
2  12  Hi, well I’m going to Roll so you have at least a shot for more money.  
I hope it works out. 
P  R  IN 
           
3  1  Hopefully I’ll make a lucky role.  E  DR  OUT 
3  2  It’s much more likely that I’ll roll a 2-6 and thus get more money then 
if we don’t roll or choose out.  I promise that I won’t cheat you and 
that I’ll choose to roll. ￿ 
P  R  IN 
3  3  Tee hee, this is kinda Twilight Zone – ism; Why not “go for it”, eh?  I 
hope you have a lovely evening as well. 
E  R  OUT 
3  4  Hello fair stranger, anonymous partner … Choose whatever you want.  
Far be it from me to influence your decision, but I think you should 
choose “in” and I should choose “roll” and we should take the chance 
at both earning as much as we can.  5 chances out of 6 say it’ll work, 
and I’m totally broke, looking to rake in stray cash however I can.  I 
feel the luck in the air. 
        I don’t really have much else to say.  Hope you’re doing well, 
whoever you are.   
        Yes. 
        That’s all.             Random note from random human 
E  R  IN 
3  5  Both of ‘us’ can earn.  E  DR  IN   43
3  6  Ok.  You’re probably thinking, lets chose out, and I’ll at least get 5 
bucks.  But… 
…Chose ‘IN’, and I WILL chose to roll. 
 
The probability that I will roll a 2,3,4,5, or 6 is pretty high, and I think 
worthy of trying for.   
 
(I have no way of assuring you that I will roll … but, its probably 
worth going for, you’ll get $12 for finding out, where I could get $10.) 
 
x. I WILL ROLL 
P  R  IN 
3  7  I will roll, so if you stay in, you’ve got a 5/6 chance of getting $12.   
 
If you don’t mind the risk, if you stay in we’ll both probably get more 
than $5 … Pretty cool to get money, eh?  I’m kinda bored.  Hope 
you’ve had a great day so far!   
 
         My country Tis of Thee 
         Sweet Land of Liberty 
         Of Thee I sing. 
         Land where my fathers died 
         Land of the Pilgrim’s Pride 
         On every mountainside 
         Let freedom ring. 
 
George W. Bush wants you to go in!  Bin Laden says “out”!  ￿ 
P  R  IN 
3  8  Lets together get the most $ out of this that we can.  ￿   
                             you 12  0   0  5 
                             me  10 10 14 5 
I promise not to do this one.  ￿ 
 
I promise I will choose to roll.  You can have the extra $2 bucks.  It’s 
good karma. 
 
                                          Thanks. 
 
I will choose ROLL in any case considering I will get the same amount 
no matter what you choose, as long as you choose IN. 
 
                                      please excuse the awful handwriting.  I’m 
trying 
 
P  DR  IN 
3  9  I’m choosing ROLL, which gives you a chance to get $12 instead of 
$5, so stay.  It’s a risk, but you could end up getting a lot more. 
P  R  IN 
3  10  If you choose in then I’m going to choose roll.  This gives you a 5/6 
chance of getting 12 dollars.  That is 7 more than if you choose out.  
Since the money is free anyway – why not believe me.  I’m don’t lie – 
I promise I will choose roll. 
P  R  IN 
3  11  If you choose IN you have the best opportunity to make the most 
money.  You have a 5/7 chance of making more money!  So IN would 
be your best bet.  Cheers.  ￿ 
E  DR  IN 
3  12  Choose IN. 
I promise I’ll ROLL. 
P  R  OUT 
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